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Applicability
The Freedom of Information Act requires every federal agency
to "publish in the Federal Register for the guidance of the public
. . . statements of general policy or interpretations of general ap-
plicability formulated and adopted by the agency."1 Another provi-
sion of the Act provides that each agency "make available for pub-
lic inspection . . . those statements of policy and interpretations
which have been adopted by the agency and are not published in
the Federal Register."2 Courts and commentators have generally
1 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(D) (1976). Section 552(a)(1) provides:
Each agency shall make available to the public information as follows:
(1) Each agency shall separately state and currently publish in the Federal Regis-
ter for the guidance of the public-
(A) descriptions of its central and field organization and the established
places at which the employees (and in the case of a uniformed service, the mem-
bers) from whom, and the methods whereby, the public may obtain information,
make submittals or requests, or obtain decisions;
(B) statements of the general course and method by which its functions are
channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all formal
and informal procedures available;
(C) rules of procedure, descriptions of forms available or the places at which
forms may be obtained, and instructions as to the scope and contents of all pa-
pers, reports, or examinations;
(D) substantive rules of general applicability adopted as authorized by law,
and statements of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formu-
lated and adopted by the agency; and
(E) each amendment, revision or repeal of the foregoing.
The section's sanction provision is quoted in note 49 infra.
2 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(B) (1976). Section 552(a)(2) provides:
Each agency, in accordance with published rules, shall make available for public
inspection and copying-
(A) final opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as
orders, made in adjudication of cases;
(B) those statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted
by the agency and are not published in the Federal Register; and
(C) administrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a mem-
ber of the public;
unless the materials are promptly published and copies offered for sale. . . . A final
order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction that
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agreed that these provisions must be interpreted together,3 but
have experienced difficulty in identifying precisely which policy
statements and interpretations must be published.4
A series of recent 5 court decisions has adopted a significant-
impact test to determine whether publication is required under
section 552(a) (1) (D).e This comment will argue that this test is in-
consistent with the language of the statute, raises other problems
of statutory construction, and is inconsistent with the intent of
Congress. The comment will then analyze the statutory language
and the relevant legislative history to determine the meaning of
section 552(a)(1)(D)'s publication requirement and will propose an
alternative guide to the meaning of the section that is consistent
with the language, history, and purpose of the Act.
I. THE EMERGING SIGNIFICANT-IMPACT TEST
Under section 552(a)(1)(D), statements of "general policy"
and "interpretations of general applicability" must be published in
the Federal Register;7 with respect to other policy statements and
interpretations, section 552(a)(2)(B) requires only that they be
"available for public inspection and copying."8 Whether a policy
statement or interpretation must be published depends, therefore,
affects a member of the public may be relied on, used, or cited as precedent by an
agency against a party other than an agency only if-
(i) it has been indexed and either made available or published as provided
by this paragraph; or
(ii) the party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.
3 See, e.g., Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652, 659 (D.N.M. 1976); Tax Analysts &
Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1303-04 (D.D.C. 1973), modified on other grounds, 505
F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974); 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 341 (2d ed. 1978);
Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 895,
899 (1974).
1 One commentator has concluded that the question "probably cannot be answered ex-
cept in vague terms." 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 341.
' Even though the publication requirement appeared in the public-information section
of the Administrative Procedure Act as originally enacted in 1946, see note 53 infra, the
section was amended in 1966 with the passage of the Freedom of Information Act. The
deletion of certain restrictions on the publication requirement, see text and notes at notes
53-54 infra, may explain the recent origin of this test.
6 United States v. Mowat, 582 F.2d 1194, 1200 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967
(1978); Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566 F.2d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 1977); Anderson v. Butz,
550 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1977); Hark v. Dragon, 477 F. Supp. 308, 315 (D. Vt. 1979);
Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F. Supp. 628, 653 (E.D. Cal. 1977); Dean v. Butz, 428 F. Supp. 477, 480
(D. Hawaii 1977); Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652, 659 (D.N.M. 1976).
See note 1 supra.
S See note 2 supra.
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on the meaning of the word "general" or the phrase "of general
applicability."9 In five recent cases, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
and several district courts have used a significant-impact test to
determine whether a policy statement or interpretation is general
or of general applicability. 10
This test was first formulated by the district court in Lewis v.
Weinberger." The Indian Health Service had sent a policy memo-
randum to agency personnel indicating that certain medical bene-
fits were unavailable to "off-reservation" Indians.12 The plaintiffs
challenged the agency's application of this policy to them, arguing
that the agency's failure to publish the memorandum made it inef-
fective. 13 The court noted that the obligation to publish policy
statements and interpretations depends on the meaning of the
I Courts and commentators have agreed that the meaning of these terms is crucial. See,
e.g., Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652, 659 (D.N.M. 1976); 1 K. DAvis, supra note 3, at
343 ("Congress has done no more than provide a framework which depends mainly on giving
meaning to the word 'general.' ").
10 See cases cited note 6 supra.
11 415 F. Supp. 652 (D.N.M. 1976). The Lewis court cited, id. at 659, two decisions as
precedent for the use of a significant-impact test. Hogg v. United States, 428 F.2d 274 (6th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971); Anderson v. Butz, 428 F. Supp. 245 (E.D. Cal.
1975), aff'd, 550 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977). Analysis of these two cases, however, indicates
that neither should be regarded as precedent for the use of a significant-impact test.
In Anderson, a Department of Agriculture "instruction" stated that HUD housing sub-
sidies were "income" for purposes of the Food Stamp Program. The court held that this
instruction was substantive, and that publication was required for substantive instructions
in addition to those of general applicability. The court said that "statements of policy and
interpretations not of general applicability or not affecting substantive rights of others
outside the agency need not be published in the Federal Register." Id. at 250. The addition
of the "substantive rights" consideration to the publication requirement of section
552(a)(1)(D) rested on two premises. First, an agency instruction with substantive impact is
not an interpretive rule or general statement of policy within section 553(b)'s exemption
from the notice-and-comment requirements. Second, publication under section 552(a)(1)(D)
must be required for all agency actions for which notice and comment are due. Id. Thus, the
Anderson court imported from section 553 an additional factor requiring publication; unlike
Lewis, it did not define the "general applicability" language of section 552(a)(1)(D) in terms
of impact.
In Hogg, the court misconstrued the statute, stating that "[uinder the provisions of 5
U.S.C. § 552, the requirement for publication attaches only to matters which if not pub-
lished would adversely affect a member of the public." 428 F.2d at 274. See also Pasco, Inc.
v. FEA, 525 F.2d 1391, 1405 (T.E.C.A. 1975) (quoting the Hogg test). As Professor Davis has
noted, "the statute contains no such limitation." 1 K. DAvis, supra note 3, at 339. The
adverse-effect language appears in the sanction provision of the Act, but not in the publica-
tion requirement. See text and notes at notes 49-52 infra.
415 F. Supp. at 656.
Id. at 657-58.
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word "general" or the phrase "of general applicability,"' 4 and
stated:
A policy statement is not qualified as "general" nor is an
administrative interpretation deemed to be "of general appli-
cability" if: (1) only a clarification or explanation of existing
laws or regulations is expressed; and (2) no significant impact
upon any segment of the public results ...
* * * [P]olicy or interpretive statements are deemed to fall
within the scope of 552(a)(1)(D) requiring their publication,
when they adopt new rules or substantially modify existing
rules, regulations, or statutes and thereby cause a direct and
significant impact upon the substantive rights of the general
public or a segment thereof.' 5
Because the substantive rights of the Lewis plaintiffs were changed
by the challenged memorandum, 6 the court concluded that the
memorandum was a "statement of general policy" within section
552(a)(1)(D). The court ordered the payment of the plaintiffs'
medical expenses and enjoined further application of the unpub-
lished standard. 7
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have added refinements to the
test formulated by the Lewis court. In Anderson v. Butz,", a De-
partment of Agriculture "instruction" required the inclusion of
rent subsidies as income for the purpose of determining eligibility
for food stamps.' 9 The Ninth Circuit held that the "instruction," a
mandatory change from existing practice, required publication be-
cause it had an immediate and direct impact on the substantive
rights of the recipients.20 Although the Lewis and Anderson courts
defined the test in terms of impact on substantive rights, the
Fourth Circuit, in Appalachian Power Co. v. Train,"' held that
agency statements have significant impact and must be published
when "knowledge of [them] is needed to keep the outside interests
" Id. at 659.
1 Id.
10 One of the plaintiffs had received benefits under prior agency standards. The memo-
randum deprived this plaintiff of the right to future benefits and changed the applicable
standards for determining the future eligibility of the other plaintiff. Id. at 655-56.
" Id. at 661-62.
1 550 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977).
19 Id. at 460.
10 Id. at 469.
21 566 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1977).
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informed of the agency's requirements in respect to any subject
within its competence."22
Hark v. Dragon23 is the only reported case in which a court
has used the significant-impact test to find publication unneces-
sary. The Regional Administrator of the Department of Labor had
written a letter to Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
("CETA") employers recommending that they establish a maxi-
mum length for CETA employment. The federal district court
held that publication was not required because the agency letter at
issue was "not of such a nature that it affects the legal rights of
[the] plaintiffs or any other persons, and is thus not within the
scope of the publication requirement. ' 25 The court stressed that
the agency letter was "merely a recommendation," which the spon-
sors were "free to adopt or reject. 26
The Appalachian Power, Anderson, and Lewis courts27 used
the significant-impact test in an explicit attempt to give meaning
to the statutory language. 28 These courts did not, however, clearly
articulate any sound reason for equating the test with the word
"general" or the phrase "of general applicability." Moreover,
analysis of the statutory language in question, other provisions of
the statute, and the relevant legislative history will demonstrate
that the significant-impact test should not be used in construing
section 552(a)(1)(D)'s publication requirement.
22 Id. at 455 (quoting United States v. Hayes, 325 F.2d 307, 309 (4th Cir. 1963)). The
plaintiffs challenged certain EPA regulations on the ground that the agency failed to pub-
lish through incorporation by reference a "Development Document." This document con-
tained information relevant to the determination of what technology was required by the
regulation. 566 F.2d at 454.
23 477 F. Supp. 308 (D. Vt. 1979).
24 Id. at 315.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 The significant-impact test was also adopted by the district court in Dean v. Butz,
428 F. Supp. 477 (D. Hawaii 1977). A letter from the Department of Agriculture required
the state of Hawaii's agency responsible for social services and housing to count housing
security deposits provided to AFDC and general-assistance recipients in the state as income
for food-stamp purposes. Since the clarification meant increased payments by recipients for
food stamps, a "substantial impact upon. . . limited budgets," it was of general applicabil-
ity and publication was required by section 552(a)(1)(D). Id. at 480.
28 See Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 566 F.2d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 1977); Anderson v.
Butz, 550 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1977); Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652, 659 (D.N.M.
1976). See also Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F. Supp. 628, 653 (E.D. Cal. 1977); 1 K. DAVIs, supra
note 3, at 343. In Hark v. Dragon, 477 F. Supp. 308, 315 (D. Vt. 1979), the court relied on
cases that had construed the language of the statute. The court did not, however, explicitly
attempt to give meaning to the statutory language. Id. at 315.
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II. A CRITIQUE OF THE SIGNIFICANT-IMPACT ANALYSIS
The significant-impact test can be criticized on several levels.
First, the test is inconsistent with the plain language of the statute.
Second, if the test is used to construe the word "general" and the
phrase "of general applicability" in section 552(a)(1)(D), problems
arise in the construction of other parts of the statute. Third, the
legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to enact a
significant-impact test in section 552(a)(1)(D).
A. The Statutory Language
Although the significant-impact test was developed as an ex-
plicit attempt to define the statutory terms "general" and "of gen-
eral applicability" in section 552(a)(1)(D), 29 "the idea of impact
cannot be extracted from the word general."30 Indeed, the signifi-
cant-impact test is both too broad and too narrow as a measure of
general applicability.
The significant-impact test does not provide sufficient guid-
ance for determining which agency statements need only be made
available, rather than published, because they are not of general
applicability. An agency pronouncement applicable to only one
person may have a significant substantive impact on that individ-
ual. Although it is unlikely that a court using the Lewis test would
require publication of such a pronouncement, the test would seem
to require publication, and is therefore overbroad.
On the other hand, statements of general policy and interpre-
tations of general applicability should be published, even if such
statements and policies do not affect legal rights. In Hark, for ex-
ample, the letter to CETA employers expressed a general agency
policy, and the plaintiffs lost their jobs as a result of that policy. 1
Yet, the Court held that publication of the policy was not neces-
sary because there had been no substantive impact on individual
rights. The program participants had no legal right to continued
29 See note 1 supra.
80 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 3, at 344. Professor Davis goes on to suggest that impact "can
be extracted from what Congress would have intended by 'general' if it had expressed itself
on the problem before the court," referring to the Lewis opinion, which he found "conserva-
tively creative." Id. at 343. Yet, as will be shown, see text and notes at notes 78-83 infra,
there is no need for conservative creativity or hypothesizing to determine congressional
intent.
3' Hark v. Dragon, 477 F. Supp. 308, 315 (D. Vt. 1979).
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employment, and the agency "recommendation" was not binding
on the employers.32
Thus, there seems to be no logical relationship between impact
and the term "general" or the phrase "of general applicability."
Given the incompatibility of the significant-impact test with the
language of section 552(a)(1)(D), the continued judicial application
of the test is indefensible.
B. Statutory Construction Problems
When the word "general" and the phrase "of general applica-
bility" in section 552(a)(1)(D) are construed in terms of the signifi-
cant-impact test, two additional problems of statutory construction
arise. First, a redundancy is created within section 552(a)(1)(D) it-
self. Second, the construction of section 552(a)(1)(D) becomes in-
consistent with the construction given section 553(b)(A).
1. The Section 552(a) (1) (D) Redundancy. Section
552(a) (1) (D) requires publication not only of "statements of gen-
eral policy or interpretations of general applicability," but also of
"substantive rules of general applicability. 3 3 The courts that have
adopted the significant-impact test have done so in construing "in-
terpretations of general applicability."34 When the significant-im-
pact meaning of "general applicability" is applied to "substantive
rules of general applicability," that phrase becomes internally
redundant.
Substantive rules, in other contexts, have generally been inter-
preted to mean rules having an impact.3 5 Yet, under the signifi-
cant-impact analysis of Lewis and other courts, the phrase "of gen-
eral applicability" also connotes impact. Thus, all substantive rules
are, under such an analysis, substantive rules of general applicabil-
ity. It is doubtful, however, that Congress meant to require the
publication of all substantive rules. To read in such an intent, one
must assume that Congress considered "of general applicability"
32 Id.
33 See note 1 supra.
" See cases cited note 28 supra.
See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Marshall, 465 F. Supp. 22, 25 (E.D. Mo. 1978)
(a statement is substantive if "'it creates or changes existing rights and obligations' ")
(quoting Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 417 F. Supp. 365, 372 (E.D. Va. 1976)); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 417 F. Supp. 365, 372 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd in relevant part, 564
F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 995 (1978). See also Saint Francis Memorial
Hosp. v. Weinberger, 413 F. Supp. 323, 329 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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and "substantive" as redundant, and yet combined them in the
phrase "substantive rules of general applicability."36
2. The Section 552(a) (1) (D)-553(b) (A) Inconsistency. Sec-
tion 553(b)(A) 3 7 of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"),38
exempts from certain notice-and-comment requirements "interpre-
tative rules [and] general statements of policy." Reading that sec-
tion in conjunction with section 552(a)(1)(D), one would suppose
that "statements of general policy or interpretations of general ap-
plicability" requiring publication under the latter section would be
exempt from notice-and-comment requirements under section
553(b)(A). All "statements of general policy" seem logically to fall
within section 553(b)(A)'s exemption for "general statements of
policy,"3 9 and under the APA definitions, "interpretations of gen-
eral applicability" are included in section 553(b)(A)'s exemption
for "interpretative rules. ' 40 Yet the courts that have adopted the
11 The statutory construction problem is strikingly illustrated in 2 B. MEZINES, J. STEIN
& J. GRUFF, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1979). While using the significant-impact test to define
interpretations of general applicability, id. at 8-33 to 34, the treatise defines substantive
rules of general applicability as "agency directives or policies which relate to the public as a
whole, including the affected party. Rules relating to just one party and a particular set of
circumstances are not considered to be generally applicable." Id. at 8-27.
37 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1976):
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or oth-
erwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law ...
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not
apply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organi-
zation, procedure, or practice ....
'8 Id. §§ 551-552, 553-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5362, 7521.
" The terms "general statements of policy" and "statements of general policy," how-
ever, may not be equivalent. The exemption in section 553(b)(A) for "general statements of
policy" apparently applies to all policy statements. Congress cannot have intended to ex-
empt only general policy statements and to require notice and comment for other, less im-
portant, "non-general" policy statements. See Koch, Public Procedures for the Promulga-
tion of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy, 64 GEo. L.J. 1047, 1051 n.17
(1976). Section 552(a)(1)(D), on the other hand, requires publication of "statements of gen-
eral policy." Presumably, some agency policy statements would not be "statements of gen-
eral policy" and would not require publication. See 1 K. DAvIs, supra note 3, at 343.
This analysis is not inconsistent with the discussion in text. Since all policy statements
are included in the section 553(b)(A) exemption, it necessarily follows that those policy
statements considered "statements of general policy" under section 552(a)(1)(D) are "gen-
eral statements of policy" under section 553(b)(A).
40 Under the relevant APA definition, rules include interpretations. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)
(1976) (" 'rule' means the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy").
Interpretations adopted and formulated by the agency are, therefore, equivalent to interpre-
tive rules.
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significant-impact test for interpreting the publication requirement
of section 552(a)(1)(D) have not given a consistent construction to
section 553(b)(A).
Courts have adopted two tests to determine whether an inter-
pretation or policy statement is exempt under section 553(b)(A):
the legal-effects test and the substantive-impact test. 1 The weight
of authority supports the proposition that a statement is not an
interpretation exempt from section 553's rulemaking requirements
if it has a binding legal effect. A strong minority position, however,
suggests that the exemption depends on whether an interpretation
has any impact on the substantive rights of those concerned. 42
Under the significant-impact test, section 552(a)(1)(D) provides
that an agency must publish interpretations that have a substan-
tive impact.43 Under either construction of section 553, however,
an agency "interpretation" having significant impact is generally
not an interpretation at all, but a legislative (or substantive) rule
requiring notice and comment.44
The Lewis case itself illustrates the inconsistency in the con-
text of policy statements. In Lewis, the court found that publica-
tion of the policy statement was required under section 552, but
also found that section 553 required notice and comment.4'5 The
court first found the memorandum in question to be "a 'statement
of general policy' within the meaning of 552(a) (1). ''46 The court
then found that the same memorandum was neither "an 'interpre-
tive rule' nor a 'general statement of policy' within the meaning of
It does not follow, however, that all interpretive rules under section 553(b)(A) are nec-
essarily "interpretations of general applicability" under section 552(a)(1)(D). Some interpre-
tive rules might be only of particular applicability. All "interpretations of general applicabil-
ity" under section 552(a)(1)(D) would, however, be interpretive rules under section
553(b)(A). Thus, any interpretive rule of general applicability would require publication in
the Federal Register and would be exempt from the notice-and-comment requirements
under section 553(b)(A).
4 Compare Pacific Gas & Elec. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (legal-effects test)
with Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970) (substantive-
impact test). See also 1 K. DAvIs, supra note 3, at 193-200; Asimow, Public Participation in
the Adoption of Interpretative Rules and Policy Statements, 75 MICH. L. REv. 520 (1977).
42 See Asimow, supra note 41, at 545.
11 See, e.g., Anderson v. Butz, 550 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977).
44 One court suggested, however, that for purposes of section 552(a)(1), an interpreta-
tion may have significant impact although it lacks binding effect. Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F.
Supp. 628, 653 (E.D. Cal. 1977). But see Anderson v. Butz, 550 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1977);
Hark v. Dragon, 477 F. Supp. 308, 315 (D. Vt. 1979). Under such an analysis, the statement
in text would not be true.
415 F. Supp. at 659, 661.
Id. at 659.
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section 553(b)(A)"; 7  no attempt was made to explain this
anomaly.48
Thus, the significant-impact test is not only inconsistent with
the publication standard imposed by Congress; its use also raises
problems in the consistent, coherent interpretation of both sec-
tions 552(a)(1)(D) and 553(b)(A). These factors suggest that Con-
gress did not intend to impose a significant-impact standard in sec-
tion 552(a)(1)(D). This conclusion receives additional support from
the manner in which Congress dealt with impact in the context of
section 552.
C. Congressional Attention to Impact
Despite the incompatibility of the significant-impact test with
the words of the statute, it is still possible that Congress, unaware
of the inconsistency, sought to impose such a test when it used the
word "general" and the phrase "of general applicability." Both the
sanction provision applicable to section 552(a)(1)(D) and the 1966
amendments to section 552(a)(1)(D) indicate, however, that Con-
gress did not intend to impose a significant-impact test in section
552(a)(1)(D).
1. The Sanction Provision of Section 552(a)(1). Section
552(a)(1) specifies the appropriate sanction for failure to publish
any of the items described in subsections 552(a)(1) (A) to (E)."' Un-
47 Id. at 661.
48 See id. See also Anderson v. Butz, 428 F. Supp. 245, 249-50 (E.D. Cal. 1975) (agency
statement held to be either an interpretation of general applicability or a general statement
of policy under section 552(a)(1)(D), but not an interpretive rule or general statement of
policy under section 553(b)(A)), afl'd, 550 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1977).
'9 The sanction provision of section 552(a)(1) provides:
Except to the extent that a person has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof, a
person may not in any manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a
matter required to be published in the Federal Register and not so published. For the
purpose of this paragraph, matter reasonably available to the class of persons affected
thereby is deemed published in the Federal Register when incorporated by reference
therein with the approval of the Director of the Federal Register.
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1) (1976). The "resort to" clause of the sanction provision has been inter-
preted to refer to agency procedural requirements. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE ACT 11 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM], reprinted in
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY
COMM., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCEBOOK, S. Doc. No. 93-82, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
210 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FOIA SOURCEBOOK] ("[T]he previous provisions relating to
failure to publish required materials applied only to materials concerning organization and
procedure. It provided that no person shall be required to resort to organization or proce-
dure not published in the Federal Register."). The "adversely affect" language was included
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less a person has received "actual and timely notice" of the terms
of an agency statement, he cannot be "required to resort to, or be
adversely affected by, a matter required to be published in the
Federal Register and not so published. '50 This clear statement of
an impact test in the sanction provision 51 applicable to section
552(a)(1)(D) indicates that Congress knew how to frame such a
test. If Congress had meant to impose such a test in section
552(a)(1)(D), it would not have done so by the use of words bear-
ing no logical relation to impact.52
by the 1966 amendments to give agencies an "added incentive" to publish statements of
general applicability that were more substantive in nature. See H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966), reprinted in FOIA SOURCEaOOK, supra, at 28.
50 See note 49 supra. The sanction provision does not provide that unpublished pro-
nouncements are void. Congress specifically intended to avoid such a result. In the Senate
Committee Report discussing the same language in a prior version of the bill, the Commit-
tee stated that the sanction required that unpublished standards be of "no force and effect."
S. REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1964), reprinted in FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 49, at 97. The subsequent Committee Report, however, deleted this language so as not
to provide for voidness when the agency statement conferred benefits on the persons af-
fected. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 49, at 11-12, reprinted in FOIA
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 49, at 210-11. This legislative history suggests that the sanction
provision should be broadly construed. But see Neighborhood Legal Servs. v. Legal Servs.
Corp., 466 F. Supp. 1148, 1154 (D. Conn. 1979) (interpreting Congress's rejection of the
voidness sanction to construe the provision narrowly).
1, The courts have not agreed on the precise nature of this test. In the majority of
cases, the courts have struck down agency action because application of the unpublished
standard "adversely affected" the parties. See, e.g., Anderson v. Butz, 550 F.2d 459, 463 (9th
Cir. 1977); Lewis v. Weinberger, 415 F. Supp. 652, 661 (D.N.M. 1976). Other courts, how-
ever, have held that the appropriate standard is not whether the substance of the unpub-
lished standard causes an "adverse effect," but whether the agency's failure to publish
causes an adverse effect. Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757, 763 n.12 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974); Neighborhood Legal Servs. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 466 F.
Supp. 1148, 1154 (D. Conn. 1979). See, e.g., Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 337 F. Supp.
1289, 1296 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972).
The statutory language does not directly support a rule requiring the challenging party
to have been harmed by the failure to publish. The sanction provision is, however, inappli-
cable when the person has "actual and timely notice" of the unpublished standard. And
under Lewis-Mota, notice is said to be timely when the person has not been adversely af-
fected by the failure to publish. This definition of timeliness thus sharply limits the scope of
the sanction provision. Other courts have refused to find timely notice in similar circum-
stances. See, e.g., Anderson v. Butz, 550 F.2d 459, 463 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that notifica-
tion when the instruction took effect could not be the actual, timely notice intended by
Congress). See also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
52 That Congress supplied a sanction only in those situations in which impact could be
demonstrated does not mean that Congress meant to require publication of interpretations
and policy statements only in those same situations. On the contrary, the original sanction
provision was not coextensive with the publication requirement. See ATTORNEY GENERAL's
MEMORANDUM, supra note 49, at 11, reprinted in FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 49, at 210.
Indeed, the House Report on the 1966 amendments, which added the "adversely affect"
language, stated that the sanction would provide "[a]n added incentive for agencies to pub-
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2. The 1966 Amendments. Section 552(a)(1)(D) originally re-
quired publication of "statements of general policy or interpreta-
tions formulated and adopted by the agency for the guidance of
the public."5" The courts read this phrase as a limitation, conclud-
ing that an agency statement need not be published unless it was a
"governmental plan or procedure which the public is required to
obey or with which it is to avoid conflict. '54 Under this reasoning, a
statement fell within the publication requirement only if it had im-
pact on substantive rights. Mere "interest to the public in any
way" was not enough to require publication.5
Congress reacted by deleting the phrase from the body of the
new subsection 552(a)(1)(D), and inserting it in the introductory
clause, a statement of purpose applicable to all subsections of sec-
tion 552(a)(1). 56 The change was expressly designed "to require
lish" material under section 552(a)(1). H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966),
reprinted in FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 49, at 28. Accord, S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1965), reprinted in FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 49, at 41. The initial incen-
tive, presumably, is provided by an agency's interest in complying with applicable law.
53 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3(a), 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (current version at
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)) (emphasis added). The original provision read:
Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any function of the United States
requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any matter relating solely to the internal
management of an agency- (a) Every agency shall separately state and currently pub-
lish in the Federal Register. . .(3) substantive rules adopted as authorized by law and
statements of general policy or interpretations formulated and adopted by the agency
for the guidance of the public, but not rules addressed to and served upon named
persons in accordance with law. No person shall in any manner be required to resort to
organization or procedure not so published.
Id. (emphasis added).
It might be noted that the current publication and availability provisions also require
"adopt[ion] by the agency." The only case to consider directly whether a statement had
been adopted by the agency is Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C.
1973), modified on other grounds, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The court rejected a nar-
row construction of this requirement, reasoning that "[t]he ordinary meaning of those words
reaches any interpretation issued by the agency or its delegates acting within the scope of
their authority." Id. at 1303. But see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMO-
RANDUM ON THE 1974 AMENDMENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AcT 16 (1975) (sug-
gesting that the adoption requirement can only be met by statements and interpretations
issued by the agency itself, or by a responsible official who has been empowered by the
agency to make authoritative issuance). A narrow construction of this requirement may be
contrary to the spirit of the Act. See 1 K. DAviS, supra note 3, at 356-58.
14 Brownell v. Schering Corp., 129 F. Supp. 879, 905 (D.N.J. 1955), affd, 228 F.2d 624
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 954 (1956). Accord, Airport Comm'n v. CAB, 300 F.2d 185,
188 (4th Cir. 1962).
61 Brownell v. Schering Corp., 129 F. Supp. 879, 905 (D.N.J. 1955), aff'd, 228 F.2d 624
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 954 (1956).
" Compare the original statute, see note 53 supra, with the text of section 552(a)(1) as
it is currently codified, see note 1 supra.
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agencies to disclose general policies which should be known to the
public, whether or not they are adopted for public guidance. ' 57 An
early Senate report explained that this amendment was intended
to change "the phrase 'for guidance of the public'. . . from a limi-
tation . . . to a descriptive phrase applicable to all matter being
published in the Federal Register. '58
When Congress rejected the public-guidance clause as a limi-
tation on the publication requirement, it tacitly disapproved judi-
cial attempts to make significant impact a determining factor. In
one recent case, Neighborhood Legal Services v. Legal Services
Corp.,59 the federal district court correctly noted that section
552(a)(1)(D) "recognizes that guidance of the public is achieved by
publication of all policies of general applicability, not only those
that regulate or supply 'guidance' to the public. '6' The court found
the agency action generally applicable and ordered publication
without invoking the significant-impact test.6 1
Other courts, however, have continued to view the phrase as a
limitation rather than a statement of purpose. For example, in
Pasco, Inc. v. FEA,6 2 the court relied on cases decided prior to the
amendments in finding that publication of a rule of procedure was
not required under section 552(a)(1)(C); the rule was "not designed
for the guidance of the public because it in no way affects any
steps which interested parties must take or not take in order to
obtain, or review, action by the Commission. 63 The effect of the
1966 amendments, as interpreted by the Pasco court, is directly
contrary to congressional intent: instead of transforming the
phrase "for the guidance of the public" from a limitation on sec-
57 ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 49, at 10, reprinted in FOLA
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 49, at 209.
16 S. REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1964), reprinted in FOIA SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 49, at 88 (emphasis added).
19 466 F. Supp. 1148 (D. Conn. 1979).
60 Id. at 1153. The court also quoted the language from the ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEM-
ORANDUM, supra note 49, at 10, reprinted in FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 49, at 209. See
text at note 57 supra.
41 466 F. Supp. at 1153.
6- 525 F.2d 1391 (T.E.C.A. 1975).
"3 Id. at 1405 (quoting T.S.C. Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 186 F. Supp.
777, 786 (S.D. Tex. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 366 U.S. 419 (1961)). See also Pitts v. United
States, 599 F.2d 1103, 1108 (1st Cir. 1979) (publication not required because "[t]he purpose
of publication in the Federal Register is public guidance"). Some recent decisions have cited
pre-1966 cases as precedent without noting the statutory change. See, e.g., Hark v. Dragon,
477 F. Supp. 308, 315 (D. Vt. 1979) (citing Airport Comm'n v. CAB, 300 F.2d 185 (4th Cir.
1962)).
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tion 552(a) (1) (D)'s publication requirement to a purely descriptive
phrase at the beginning of section 552(a)(1), the 1966 change
makes the limitation applicable to all the subsections of 552(a)(1).
The Pasco court's approach should be rejected. The 1966 amend-
ments should be viewed as a clear rejection of a significant-impact
test under section 552(a)(1)(D), and the appropriate publication
standard should be determined by reference to the words of the
statute construed in the light of their context and legislative
history.
III. THE INTENDED SCOPE OF THE PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT
A. Statutory Language and Structure
Section 552(a)(1)(D)'s language--"statements of general policy
or interpretations of general applicability"--focuses on the scope,
rather than the effect, significant or otherwise, of the agency pro-
nouncement. Thus, the statutory language suggests that publica-
tion is required when an interpretation or policy statement is rele-
vant to many or most members of the public. Interpretations or
policy statements not applicable to many members of the public do
not require publication; availability under 552(a)(2)(B) is
sufficient.
This reading of the statutory language is supported by the
structure of section 552(a). Each subsection of 552(a)(1), the publi-
cation requirement, refers to matters of interest to the public at
large,64 while the provisions of section 552(a)(2) require that infor-
mation relevant to particular individuals be made available.""
Under subsection (a)(1), agencies must publish (A) organizational
descriptions whereby "the public may obtain information, make
submittals or requests, or obtain decisions," (B) statements of gen-
eral course and method, (C) rules of procedure, and (D) substan-
tive rules, interpretations, and policy statements of general appli-
cability. Under section 552(a)(2), on the other hand, agencies must
make available "for public inspection" (A) final opinions made in
the adjudication of cases, (B) those statements of policy and inter-
pretations not published in the Federal Register, and (C) "admin-
istrative staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a mem-
ber of the public." Adjudications by their very nature involve
particular parties and specific factual situations. Statements of
64 See note 1 supra.
5 See note 2 supra.
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policy and interpretations not published in the Federal Register
must necessarily be of particular, rather than general, applicability.
Similarly, although staff manuals and instructions can be of gen-
eral interest, the language used by Congress-"that affect a mem-
ber of the public"--identifies relevance to a particular individual,
as opposed to the general public.66 The statute thus distinguishes,
in organization as well as in language, between agency pronounce-
ments of general applicability and those of interest to particular
individuals; no distinction is drawn in terms of the impact of the
agency statement.
B. Legislative History of the "General Applicability" Term
The original APA publication requirement did not contain the
words "general applicability." The legislative history indicates,
however, that Congress considered the original wording equivalent
to the, current wording-and intended to fashion a standard that
would focus on scope rather than impact..
The Senate version of the original APA required publication
of all rules,6 7 but "rule" was defined to include only statements of
general applicability.6" In subsequent amendments prior to pas-
sage, the definition of rules was changed to include those state-
ments of particular applicability so as to cover "cases characterized
by the shaping of broad policies upon the basis of masses of tech-
nical data,"6 and the publication requirement was modified to ex-
clude from publication those rules addressed to named persons. 70
" As originally enacted, this section required that administrative staff manuals and in-
structions to staff be made available to the public when they "affect any member of the
public." Public Information Availability Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, § 3(b), 80 Stat. 250 (1966)
(current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1976)). This language, however, was modified in the
process of codifying the statute. Neither the Committee Report nor the codification explains
the change. H.R. REP. No. 125, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. REP. No. 248, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1967). The difference does not seem significant.
67 S. 7, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1945), reprinted in S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 33 (1945) and SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 219 (1946) [hereinafter cited as
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
68 S. 7, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 21(c) (1945), reprinted in S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 32 (1945) and LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 67, at 218.
69 Giannane, "Rule Making," "Adjudication" and Exemptions Under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, 95 U. PA. L. REV. 621, 626 (1947). See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 67, at 125 (testimony of ICC Commissioner Aitchison before House Judiciary Subcom-
mittee in June, 1945).
70 See H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 67, at 284.
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As so amended, this version of the publication requirement was
enacted; it required publication of "substantive rules adopted as
authorized by law and statements of general policy or interpreta-
tions formulated by the agency for the guidance of the public, but
not rules addressed to and served upon named persons in accor-
dance with law."71 The House Report explained that if all rules
served on named individuals were published, the Federal Register
would be filled "with a great mass of particularized rule making
which has always been satisfactorily handled without general pub-
lication. '72 Agencies were required, however, to make these rules
available to the public.78 The Attorney General's contemporaneous
explanation of the section notes that the provision was "designed
to avoid filling the Federal Register with a great mass of particu-
larized rule-making," such as rate schedules or advisory interpreta-
tions relating to specific situations.74 Thus, Congress intended the
scope of the agency action, not its impact, to determine whether
publication was required.
The addition of the "general applicability" language in 1966 to
both the substantive-rule and interpretation clauses, and the corre-
sponding deletion of the "named persons" language, does not
change this conclusion; the Senate Report described this change as
a technical one.75 In a report on an earlier version of the bill en-
acted in 1966,"' the Senate Judiciary Committee discussed the in-
sertion of the "general applicability" modifier, and stated:
71 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3(a), 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (current version at
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)). For the full text of this provision, see note 53 supra.
72 H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 n.6 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 67, at 284. The original Senate bill did not include policy statements
and interpretations in the provision's publication requirements. They were included, how-
ever, when the bill was reported to the Senate floor. Compare S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 12 (1945) with id. at 33. No explanation of the change was made.
13 See note 53 supra. The House Report noted: "This change supplements the change
explained in note 6. If some rules are not published in the Federal Register, then clearly
they should be made available .... " H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 n.7
(1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 67, at 284.
74 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURE AcT 22 (1947).
75 S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965). See also H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966) ("A number of minor changes . .. clarify . . . that the Federal
Register is a publication in which the public can find the details of the administrative oper-
ations of Federal agencies."); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 49, at 10, re-
printed in FOIA SOURCEBOOK, supra note 49, at 209.
71 S. 1666, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). This bill was extremely similar to the one finally
adopted. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified at 5
U.S.C. § 552(a) (1976)). One difference between the two bills was that the former required
[47:351
Freedom of Information Act
In section 2 of the Administrative Procedure Act, rules
are defined in such a way that there is no distinction between
those of a particular applicability (such as rates) and those of
general applicability. It is believed that only rules, statements
of policy, and interpretations of general applicability should
be published in the Federal Register; those of particular ap-
plicability or [sic] legion in number and have no place in the
Federal Register and are presently excepted but by more
cumbersome language.
Congressional intent was unambiguous: interpretations and policy
statements of general applicability were to be published, while
those of particular applicability were to be available at agency of-
fices. This distinction is not, however, without ambiguity. "Of par-
ticular applicability" might mean an interpretation or policy state-
ment applicable only to named individuals-or it might mean an
interpretation or policy statement substantively equivalent to ad-
judication rather than legislation. It is, therefore, necessary to de-
termine which interpretation provides a principled test consistent
with the intent of Congress.
IV. THE MEANING OF THE GENERAL/PARTICULAR DISTINCTION
The legislative history of the APA suggests that Congress in-
tended "general applicability" to be determined by a formal stan-
dard: whether the interpretation or policy statement is applicable
only to named individuals. Moreover, the application of a standard
that ignores form and instead turns on whether the interpretation
or policy statement is in substance "of general applicability" would
prove to be impractical and unprincipled.
A. The Named-Persons Standard
1. Legislative History. As originally enacted, section
552(a)(1)(D) required publication of all rules and interpretations
except those "addressed to and served upon named persons."78 Al-
the availability of "rules, statements of policy, and interpretations which have been adopted
by the agency, affect the public and are not required to be published in the Federal Regis-
ter." S. 1666, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (emphasis added). The "affect the public" lan-
guage was dropped when a modified version of the bill was introduced in the Senate. S.
1160, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
7 S. REP. No. 1219, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1964), reprinted in FOIA SOURCaBOOK,
supra note 49, at 89.
7' See text and notes at notes 68-74 supra.
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though this standard was deleted in 1966, the legislative history
indicates that the named-persons standard was always equivalent
to the "of general applicability" standard.7 9
As discussed above, the named-persons exception was added
to the original APA bill when the definition of rules was amended
to include "agency statements" of "particular" as well as "general"
applicability.80 The House Committee explained that the named-
persons exception was necessary to avoid publication of particular-
ized rules."' Thus, the named-persons standard was originally
designed to track the general/particular distinction.8 2 Moreover,
when Congress amended the publication provision in 1966, the
substitution of the general applicability phrase for the named-per-
sons exception was not intended to change the publication
standard. 3
2. Evaluation of the Named-Persons Standard. A named-
persons standard has several advantages. It is a formal test that
can be applied by the courts without difficulty, and agencies can
easily determine in advance whether publication is necessary.
" See text and notes at notes 75-77 supra.
80 See text and notes at notes 68-70 supra.
81 See text and note at note 72 supra.
82 In a 1938 regulation concerning a publication requirement in the Federal Register
Act, Pub. L. No. 74-220, ch. 417, § 5, 49 Stat. 501 (1935) (current version at 44 U.S.C. § 1505
(1976)), "general applicability" seemed to be equated with a named-persons standard, 3
Fed. Reg. 2458 (1938). The regulation defined "general applicability" as "currently relevant
or applicable to the general public, the members of a class, or the persons of a locality, as
distinguished from named individuals or organizations." Id.
The publication requirement in the Federal Register Act is not, however, equivalent to
the publication requirement in section 552(a)(1)(D). The former requires publication of cer-
tain documents "of general applicability and legal effect," while the latter requires publica-
tion only of certain documents "of general applicability." In United States v. Mowat, 582
F.2d 1194 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978), the court confused the relation be-
tween the two statutes. In United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962), Judge
Friendly correctly noted that the APA requires publication of additional material. Other
courts have expressed awareness of a possible relation without addressing the issue. See,
e.g., Aiken v. Obledo, 442 F. Supp. 628, 654 n.15 (E.D. Cal. 1977); Anderson v. Butz, 428 F.
Supp. 245, 250 n.8 (E.D. Cal.), affd, 550 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1977).
83 See text and note at note 75 supra. Professor Davis has stated that the legislative
history of the "general applicability" term provides no assistance in understanding the
scope of the publication requirement. K. DAVIS, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW TREATISE 125 (Supp.
1970); Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761, 769
(1967). Two paragraphs before concluding that the legislative history is unhelpful, however,
Professor Davis states that the named-persons exception was "adequately expressed by the
words 'of general applicability.'" K. DAvIS, supra, at 125 n.22; Davis, supra, at 768 n.22. It
is difficult to understand how the legislative history can be of no assistance in determining
the meaning of "general applicability" when that history indicates that general applicability
was intended to be equivalent to the named-persons standard.
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Moreover, the distinction incorporated in this test, although for-
mal, is not arbitrary. Interpretations and policy statements ad-
dressed to named persons will not usually be intended to set broad
agency standards equally relevant to other individuals. Interpreta-
tions and policy statements not addressed to named persons are
more likely, however, to state broad agency standards "of general
applicability." Indeed, on its face, such a pronouncement can be
regarded as "of general applicability" because it is not addressed
to only named individuals.
The distinction between named and unnamed interpretations
and policy statements resembles the distinction between adjudica-
tion and legislation. Although laws purport to set broad policies,
cases purport only to apply law to the factual situation presented
by the particular litigants. There may be strong policy reasons for
requiring the publication of all interpretations and policy state-
ments; an interpretation addressed to a specific individual may
well influence future agency pronouncements in similar fact situa-
tions. There is no logical inconsistency, however, in requiring pub-
lication of legislation-like agency pronouncements but not adjudi-
cation-like pronouncements.
Since the named-persons standard is a formal test of the gen-
eral/particular distinction, it suffers from two weaknesses. First, an
agency can evade the publication requirement merely by address-
ing a pronouncement to specific individuals. Second, the test will
only tend to identify correctly those agency pronouncements likely
to be "of general applicability." For example, a new and broad
statement of agency policy may be incorporated in a letter re-
sponding to an inquiry from a single individual. The policy is not
less "general" in its scope because the letter is addressed to a sin-
gle individual.
Although both the Senate and House Reports referred to the
1966 amendment of section 552(a)(1) as "technical,"84 the new lan-
guage, "of general applicability," is arguably less restrictive than
the original wording, "served on named persons in compliance with
the law." Thus, it may be argued that Congress intended some
change in the formality of the publication standard. The 1966
amendment may indicate a shift from a purely formal standard to
a more substantive one distinguishing between those agency ac-
tions that resemble adjudications and are limited in their scope,
8 See text and notes at notes 75-77 supra.
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and those that resemble legislation and are "of general
applicability."
B. A Substantive Standard
A substantive standard would be designed to identify directly
those agency pronouncements that are "of general applicability"
regardless of their form. Under such a standard, agencies would
not be able to evade the publication requirement by controlling the
form of the agency pronouncement. Moreover, the standard would
correspond to the intent of Congress in requiring publication of
agency pronouncements "of general applicability." Unfortunately,
the weakness of this standard becomes apparent when an attempt
is made to identify precisely what it is that makes an agency inter-
pretation or policy statement "of general applicability."
1. The Legislation/Adjudication Distinction. As discussed
above, those agency pronouncements that are more like legislation
than adjudication might be considered "of general applicability."
Those agency pronouncements that merely apply existing law or
are based on the resolution of legal issues rather than policy deci-
sions might be considered more like adjudication than legislation.
Each of these distinctions breaks down, however, under closer
scrutiny.
The application-of-existing-law distinction is based on the
proposition that agency interpretations or policy statements that
only apply existing law are not "of general applicability." This pro-
position is untenable for two reasons. First, it merely restates the
significant-impact test. As is true of other formulations of the sig-
nificant-impact test, there is no logical relationship between scope
of applicability and whether an interpretation or policy statement
applies existing law. Second, this standard would be impossible to
administer. An agency would have to examine every agency pro-
nouncement to determine whether it applied or extended existing
statutes, published rules, interpretations, or policy statements.
The law/policy distinction is based on the premise that those
agency actions that are more like legislation than adjudication be-
cause they are basically policy decisions are "of general applicabil-
ity," and that those actions that are more like adjudication because
they are basically legal decisions are not "of general applicability."
Yet no such correlation exists. Legal decisions often establish rules
of general applicability, while policy decisions may be extremely
limited in scope.
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The application-of-existing-law and law/policy distinctions
thus fail to provide an adequate theoretical foundation for the leg-
islation/adjudication distinction suggested by the "general applica-
bility" phrase. And, given the failure of the APA substantively to
distinguish adjudication from rulemaking, a5 any attempt to rest
determinations of "general applicability" on a substantive distinc-
tion between adjudication and legislation is likely to fail. Under
the APA, an agency is free to develop all principles, interpreta-
tions, and policies through adjudication."6 Although the distinction
between rulemaking and adjudication is central to the APA, a7 the
distinction is made in only a purely formal and conclusory
manner.
s
2. The Many/Few Distinction. Perhaps an agency pro-
nouncement is not "of general applicability" when it is applicable
to only a few individuals.89 If those individuals are named in the
pronouncement and receive copies of it, this test is merely a re-
statement of the named-persons standard. If this standard does
not require that the "few" individuals to whom it is addressed be
named and receive copies of the pronouncement, it is necessary to
determine how many unnamed individuals constitute a few.
Whether the pronouncement is applicable to only a discrete group
cannot b.e determinative since most, if not all, interpretations and
policy statements will apply to less than all individuals. This ver-
sion of a substantive standard would, therefore, require that courts
decide on an ad hoc, after-the-fact basis whether or not an agency
8" See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,
1978 Sup. CT. REv. 345, 383 ("it is generally acknowledged that the only responsible judicial
attitude toward this central APA definition is one of benign disregard").
8' See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974).
87 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 294-97 (1958).
" Compare 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1976) (" 'rulemaking' means agency process for formulat-
ing, amending, or repealing a rule") with id. § 551(7) ("'adjudication' means agency process
for the formulation of an order").
89 This standard was approved in Note, The Freedom of Information Act: Access to
Law, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 765 (1968), an early criticism of Professor Davis's approach. The
author suggested:
If a standard will in fact be applicable to a large number of persons, in the public at
large or within an identifiable class, then it is general. If it has an adversarial flavor and
is directed, either expressly or in fact, at a small number within a class, then it is not
general.
Id. at 774. The Note did not rely on the legislative history of section 552(a)(1)(D) to support
this formulation, but argued instead by analogy to the rulemaking/adjudication distinction.
Id. at 771.
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pronouncement is applicable to so few individuals that publication
is unnecessary.
This standard is less desirable than the named-persons stan-
dard. The many/few distinction cannot give agencies clear gui-
dance as to which pronouncements should be published. Even after
a coherent body of case law develops as to the meaning of the stan-
dard, the agency often will not know how many individuals, other
than addressees, are within the scope of an interpretation, rule, or
policy. If, for example, the IRS receives a request for a private let-
ter ruling on the tax treatment of a particular corporate transac-
tion, it may be unable to determine whether its answer is applica-
ble to only a "few." The administrative difficulties created by the
many/few distinction, combined with the substantial overlap be-
tween the many/few and the named-persons standards,90 indicate
that it would be inappropriate to deviate from the standard specif-
ically created by Congress: the named-persons standard.
CONCLUSION
This comment has argued that the need for publication under
section 552(a)(1)(D) should be determined by reference to the stat-
utory language rather than the significant-impact test. Not only is
the significant-impact test inconsistent with the language of the
statute, its use has created other problems of statutory meaning
and consistency. Moreover, there is evidence that Congress did not
intend to impose a significant-impact test when it used the word
"general" and the phrase "of general applicability." Finally, the
legislative history indicates that Congress did mean to require pub-
lication of interpretations and policy statements that are "general"
rather than "particular." Analysis of the possible meanings of this
distinction and the relevant legislative history indicates that courts
should require publication of interpretations and policy statements
not addressed to named persons.
Victor H. Polk, Jr.
90 One would expect that agency pronouncements directed to named persons would ap-
ply only to a few individuals. Conversely, agency statements relevant to only a few individu-
als should be specifically directed to those named persons.
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